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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
District Court of Juab CountyCivil No. 3770
GERALD FOWKES, et al
Plaintiffs, Respondents and
Cross AppellamJs,
vs.
CURRENT CREEK IRRIGATION CO.,
a corporation, et al,
Defenda;nts and Appellants.

Case
No. 8745

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Three cases were consolidated for trial. They were
disposed of by entry of a single set of Findings of Fact
and Decree. The first case was brought by this appellant, Current Creek Irrigation Company, against Orville
Andrews (Civil No. 3763). In that action the Irrigation
Company asked the court to enjoin the defendant Andrews from molesting its wells. There was a prayer for
damage, but this was not pressed. As to this action, the
court enjoined the defendant Andrews from interfering
with plaintiff's wells, and adjudged that matters of ad1
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ministration and distribution were by statute vested in
the State Engineer (R. 173). Therefore, as to this matter, the Irrigation Company prevailed, and it has not
appealed therefrom.
The second action was brought by Orville Andrews
et al, against Current Creek Irrigation Company (Civil'
No. 3768), under Section 73-3-14, U.C.A., 1953, for
plPnary revieY\" of the action of the State Engineer in
approving the Irrigation Company's change application.
rrhis change application involved a change in the location of three wells. The original application sought to
appropriate "rater from wells to be drilled at designated locations. The change application was filed to permit the drilling of three wells at new locations. The
State Engineer had approved the change. As to this matter, the trial court affirmed the State Engineer (R. 173).
Thus, as to this second action, the Irrigation Company
"~as also the prevailing party, and it has not appealed
therefrom.
The third action "~as brought by the plaintiffs
Fowkes against the Current Creek Irrigation Company
and the ..:\..ndrf'l\\.8 group (l""'iivil Xo. 3770). They alleged
that th~ plaintiffs Fo·w·kes w·ere the owners of various
fl<n,·ing "·plls and a 8pring. The . A. ndrews group own
and opt\rate a pump \Yt... ll, from "·hieh they pump approximn 1Ply ~ix e. f. 8. of \Vater. The Irrigation Company has
d rillP<l fi,.l. . \\.t\ll8~ all of \Yhieh flow. Because of the opera-

tion of thP pump \\·t--.11 hy tlH• defendants Andrews and the
11~(\ of the I rriga tiou C\nnpany flo"· \Yells, it was alleged
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that the shallower flow wells and the spring of the plaintiffs Fowkes had ceased to flow. The plaintiffs Fowkes
sought money damages and also sought an injunction
against future interference. As a separate count, the
plaintiffs Fowkes also appealed the action of the State
Engineer in approving the Irrigation Company's abovementioned change application.
As to this action, the trial court held that the plaintiffs had a vested right to have artesian pressure remain
as it was when the Fowkes wells were drilled and ordered
the Irrigation Company and the defendants Andrews
each to replace one-half of the plaintiffs' water. From
this part of the judgment, the Irrigation Company has
appealed.
The trial court further held that the plaintiffs
Fowkes had failed to mitigate their damages, and because
of this denied money damages.
In their answer in Civil 3770 the defendants Andrews
filed a cross-complaint against Current Creek Irrigation
Company. This cross-complaint alleged that the Andrews
people owned some flow wells and the right to use the
flow of some springs ; that their flow wells and springs had
ceased to flow because of the flow wells of the Irrigation
Company, and they sought money damages for crop loss,
and for an injunction. As to this claim, the trial court
held that the Andrews had not proved the extent to which
their flow wells and spring were interfered with by the
operation of their own pump well as distinguished from
3
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interference from the Irrigation Company flow wells.
Damages for past interference were denied, and no relief
'vas granted as to the future.
There have been cross-appeals. We will not endeavor
to state the basis therefor. We note only that the appeal
of the Irrigation Company urges three basic matters:
First, 've challenge the conclusion of law that the shallo'v 'vell owners have a vested right to have the water
table and artesian pressure remain as they were when
they made their appropriations. Second, we assert that
the trial court erred in finding that the water rights of
plaintiffs Fowkes were for 1.775 c. f. s. We do not deny
that they have valid appropriations, but we do deny that
the quantity appropriated is 1.775 c. f. s. Third, the court
ignored several important factors in its replacement
order.

THE

FOR~I

OF THE RECORD

There were petitions for injunctions pendente lite in
t"·o of the cases. The transc.ript of the evidence adduced
at tho~e hearings has been brought up as a part of the
record, and the use of this evidence is covered by stipulations of the pnrties, "·hich we will refer to in more detail
hPlo"·· As a consequenee, there are three separate transcripts of 0Yidence, each beginning with a different series
of 1)age numbers. ,,. . t"\ haYe asked the Clerk of the Suprernl\ (~ourt to assign to each of these transcripts a volume numhPr, ,vith ':olumt"\ 1 designating the evidence in
the ca~l\ hrought br the Irrigation Company to enjoin
A.ndrP\VS front interfering "Tith its 'Yells; and Volume 2
4
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designating the proceedings in which the plaintiffs
Fowkes asked for a temporary injunction. The large
transcript which contains the evidence adduced at the
trial of the consolidated cases will be referred to as the
record (R). Because there are multiple appellants, crossappellants, respondents and cross-respondents, we believe
that such designation would be confusing. We, therefore,
will refer to the parties as follows: Current Creek Irrigation Company will be referred to simply as the
"Irrigation Company." The group of people interested
in the Andrews wells and springs will be referred to collectively as ''Andrews,'' although some of them have
other surnames. The group who sought money damages
against both the irrigation company and the defendants
Andrews will be designated collectively as the ''plaintiffs Fowkes.'' The State of Utah is a party in two different capacities. The State Engineer was involved insofar
as his decision on Change Application A-2786 was concerned. If vve refer to him we will do so by the designation
"State Engineer." The Utah Water & Power Board
holds an assignment for security purposes only of the
applications of the Irrigation Company covering its five
flow wells. The Utah Water & Power Board will, wherever we refer to it, be designated as the "Water & Power
Board.''
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties, except the State of Utah, are all owners of wells which take water from a single hydrologic
basin. The defendants Andrews take water from the

5
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basin by three different means. First, they are the owners of the right to use during the irrigation season waters
issuing from springs. ( R. 244, 27 4). They are also the
owners of a number of relatively shallow artesian flow
wells (Vol. 2, p. 16). They have filed two applications for
large wells (Finding 2, R. 141). One of the pump wells
has been drilled to a depth of approximately 300 feet
(Vol. 1, page 5) and it pumps approximately 6 c. f. s. of
water (Vol. 2, p. 38). The other well is not yet drilled.
The plaintiffs Fowkes take water from a number of
relatively shallow wells, varying in depth from 16 feet to
200 feet (plaintiffs' Exh. 1), with the bulk of the wells
being between 60 and 90 feet in depth (R. Vol. 2, p 40,
plaintiffs' Exh. 1). The Fowkes also use water from a
spring during the irrigation season (R. 76).
The Irrigation Company has an application for 18
c. f. s. of water from three wells (Exh. E). The change
application proposed to take the same water from five
wells (Exh. F). All five wells have been drilled, and
they all flow. The total flow from the five wells is a pproximately 2.74 c.f.s. (R. 47). In addition, the Irrigation
Company owns the Mona Reservoir (R. 295), which is
located in the bottom of the hydrologic basin (R. 143}.
The Irrigation Company ov\Tns the \Yinter flow of the various springs, the flow of \Yhich \vould be into the Mona
Reservoir. The trial court so held (Finding No. 6, p. 167.
See also Vol. 2, p. 87 ~ Vol. 3, p. ~55-7).
All of the 'veils o''rned by the parties \Yho are before
the court are loented immediately south of ~fo11a., Utah
6
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(R. Vol. 2, p. 11-16). To the east are mountain streams
which have created an alluvial fan around the toe of the
mountain (R. 189, 42). The fan and others like it to the
south are not orthodox fans, in that the streams were
flowing into a water-filled valley at the time Lake Bonneville occupied the area (R. 189). Thus, the lower part of
the fan has been reworked by the action of the lake (R.
189). These fans have coarse materials up on the fans
and down near the toe of the fans, the materials become
finer and less inclined to yield good quantities of water
(R. 160-1, 178). The Andrews pump well is located nearest to the mountains. It is a good water well, yielding
approximately 6 c. f. s. by pumping (R. Vol. 2, p. 38),
and in the opinion of Dr. Hansen probably is located in
an area of the fan where there are coarse materials, where
the water flowing from the East has tended to create
channeling (R. 177). Lower down on the same fan, and
still well up on the fan itself are the relatively shallow
flow wells of the Andrews group and the plaintiffs
Fowkes. There is also located on the same fan a well
owned by the Union Pacific Railroad Company, which had
been leased to the principal stockholder of the Irrigation
Company (R. 227, 293.) The wells of the Irrigation Company are located at or beyond the toe of this fan (R. 178).
Tests have been conducted for interference by the
State Engineer. These tests show, without dispute, that
there is interference. When the Andrews pump well is
started, the water level drops in the shallow wells. When
the Andrews pump well is turned off, the water level in
the shallow wells rises (Vol. 2, p. 20-24; R. 14-15). The

7
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same effect can be measured by closing and opening the
Irrigation Company flow wells (Vol. 2, p. 37). The drawdown by reason of the use of the Irrigation Company flow
wells and the Andrews pump well is not great. For example, the maximum measured change in water level in
the Andrews flow well from manipulations of the Irrigation Company wells was only 0.8 of one foot (Vol. 1, p.
41). The evidence shows that the Andrews pump well
has been extensively pumped since 1951 (R. 245 and Vol.
2, p. 67). The Irrigation Company flow wells were drilled
starting in 1951 and have been allowed to flow open, winter and summer with the water going into storage in the
Mona Reservoir (Vol. 2, p. 48, 86). The water cycle since
at least 1954 has been drier than normal (R. 37). Still,
during the period of heavy use, the water in the shallow
flow wells has never been more than about nine feet from
ground surface (R. Vol. 2, p. 38) and on the date of the
trial in December of 1956, following a season of normal
use of the "\Veils, one of the flow 'veils had again started to
flow (R. 32).
There is a more direct and immediate connection between the Andrews pump well and the shallow wells than
exists between the Irrigation Company wells and the shallow wells (R. Vol. 2, p. 30). Ho,Yever, the net effect is
the same, in that each dra,vs "~ater from the same hydrologic basin, and the 'Yater level drops in direct proportion
to the amount of 'vater '""ithdra'v11 (R. 33, 171, 172). It
doesn't rna tter 'v here the "Ta t.er is taken from the basin.
The net withdra,Ynl is tht~ thing that causes the water
table to drop (R. 33, 171-2) and 've admit that the evi8
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dence adequately supports the trial court's finding that
the pump well of Andrews and the flow wells of the Irrigation Company cause some drop in the water table
(Finding No. 12, R. 168).
We think the evidence conclusively showed other
withdrawals from this same hydrologic basin, which
would also contribute to the lowering of the water table.
The trial court over-simplified the problem and elected to
treat the water development on the fan near Mona as
though it were isolated from all other areas. There appeared to be no dispute concerning the fact that there is a
single hydrologic basin which extends from south of
Nephi on the south, is bounded by the mountain areas to
the East and West, and has its outlet on the N or.th
through the Mona Reservoir. Mr. Mayo so testified (R. 28,
33). Dr. Hansen concurred (R. 143, 145). In addition,
the evidence conclusively shows that the movement of
water, both surface and underground is from the south
to the north, and the Mona Reservoir is the outlet for the
basin (R. 145, 166, 195). Water taken anywhere from
the basin will affect water levels, but the effect will differ,
depending on where the wells are located (R. 159, 168).
Wells on the same fan have a more direct effect on each
other than do wells in the bottom of the basin or wells
located on different fans (R. 159). But withdrawals
of water from the basin or from adjoining fans which
coalesce will draw down the water table (R. 168, 178).
There have recently been several large wells drilled
in the vicinity of Nephi. Collectively they take from this
9
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basin about 21 c. f. s. of water and since some of them are
for municipal purposes, they are operated on a yeararound basis (Vol. 2, p. 39). These Nephi wells are not
on the same fan as are the wells owned by the parties to
this suit. Dr. Hansen expressed the unequivocal opinion
that these Nephi wells would have the effect of lowering
'vater levels in the basin in the Mona area. He gave a
rather detailed explanation of the matter (R. 150-174,
193-195).
The owners of those wells were not made parties to
the suit, and the effect those wells have had on plaintiffs'
wells was ignored by the trial court. The Nephi wells in
the main have priorities later than the wells of Andrews
and the Irrigation Company (R. 39, 45 of Vol. 2).
Both Mr. Mayo and Dr. Hansen were of the opinion
that the basin had not yet been fully appropriated, and
that still more water can be ·withdrawn from the basin,
without depleting it (Vol. 2, p. 58, 59; 198, 199, 147). In
fact, to utilize the underground reservoir properly, Dr.
Hansen testified that it would be necessary to draw the
vvater down during periods of use and during dry cycles
and to refill it during periods of nonuse and during wet
cycles (R. 146). Th1:r. Gardner, engrneer for plaintiffs
Fowkes, agreed (R. 74).
We want at this point also to note one other matter,
the effect of \Yhich \Ve \Yill argue in detail as one of our
points on appeal. That is, the eYidenee conc-lusively
sho\vs that if an underground artesian basin is kept full,
so thnt a shallo\Y \Yell 16 feet deep (the depth of one of
10
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the wells of plaintiffs Fowkes, Ex. 1, which we have been
ordered to protect) will flow, artesian pressures will be
relatively high and water will escape in the lower portions
of the basin through seeps, springs and swamp area, and
be available to us in our Reservoir. All of the experts so
testified. Mr. Mayo (Vol. 2, p. 67, 61, 62) ; Dr. Hansen
191-93); and Mr. Gardner (R. 73). The springs which
were used by defendants Andrews and plaintiffs Fowkes
in the summer time, and flow to the Mona Reservoir
owned by the Irrigation Company in the winter time
(Finding No. 3) clearly are related to the water level in
this basin. Both Fowkes and Andrews have proceeded
upon that theory. The evidence sho\vs that these springs
have gone dry (R. 274). The court has found that they
have gone dry, because of the Andrews pump well and the
large wells of the Irrigation Company, and has ordered
replacement of the water; (Finding 12, p. 168).
Both Dr. Hansen and Mr. Mayo indicated that these
seeps, marshes and springs are to be expected along the
bottom of an artesian basin where the pressures are
kept high in the basin. They also both noted that the Mona
Reservoir is the bottom of this basin (Vol. 2, page 57).
If anyone has been deprived of the natural condition,
it is the Irrigation Company. We are not here urging that
the court should enjoin all ground water development. We
merely state that if each appropriator has a vested right
to have natural conditions remain as they were when he
filed his appropriation (as plaintiff Fowkes urge) why
11
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does not the same concept extend to us and thus prevent
all ground water development in this basin above our
Reservoir~

STATEMENT OF POINTS OF APPEAL
I. The court erred in holding that the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3770 have a vested right to have artesian
pressures and ground water levels maintained at such a
level as to permit them to get their water through shallow wells without pumping.
II. The court erred in entering its order requiring
replacement of the "\Vater, in that there is not sufficient
proof of the quantity of water appropriated by the various plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3770 to support an order
for replacement, in any event.
III. The Court erred in requiring appellant Current
Creek Irrigation Company to pump or replace one-half of
the water for the said plaintiffs.
IV. The court erred in entering its order requiring
replacement of water for the plaintiffs, in that there is no
basis in the record for apportioning the replacement
costs.
V. The court erred in finding and concluding that
the only eause for diminution of pressure for plaintiffs'
'veils 'vas interference hy Andrc"~s and this appellant,
when the evidence sho""'s other depletions of ground
'vater supp] y.

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL NO. 3770
HAVE A VESTED RIGHT TO HAVE ARTESIAN
PRESSURES AND GROUND WATER LEVELS
MAINTAINED AT SUCH A LEVEL AS TO PERMIT THEM TO GET THEIR WATER THROUGH
SHALLOW WELLS WITHOUT PUMPING.
We first urge that the trial court erred in holding
that the shallow well owners have a vested right to have
the ground vvater levels in the reservoir maintained at the
level which existed when they drilled their well. We believe that the underground water law must develop on a
different basis. We think no one can have a vested right
to keep an underground reservoir full and spilling out of
a shallow well 16 feet deep. We believe that everyone
should be held to have made his appropriation with
knowledge that the basin would be developed, and that
he might in the future be required to make reasonable
expenditures to get his water from a properly operated
reservoir. If we are correct in this theory, then all other
matters which we hereafter argue become unimportant,
for the evidence conclusively shows that the development
to date has only reduced the water level on a December
to following December basis, a total of three to four feet
(R. 34), and during the period of heaviest use the water
has never been drawn more than nine to ten feet from the
surf ace of the ground at any flow well. If there is no
vested right to a full reservoir, then there is no basis for
a damage claim, or for an order of replacement. If there
is such a vested right to have conditions remain as they

13
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were when an appropriation is made, then we urge in
Point III that this should apply to protect the Irrigation
Company, for it cannot be disputed that the Irrigation
Company's reservoir received the total overflow from the
natural basin (Vol. 2, page 57).
This particular problem of artesian pressure presents "\vhat will be the next major development in water
law in the West. Surface streams have been over appropriated. Various conservation practices, such as changing flow rights to storage, capturing return flow, etc., are
being put into effect, but other than through conservation and more efficient use, surface streams are no longer
open to appropriation. We also have the enormous multiple purpose projects costing hundreds of millions of
dollars, like the Colorado River project, but the individual
appropriator now has open to him in Utah only the unappropriated ground water.
The evidence in this case demonstrates (and withon t evidence the court probably could take judicial
notice) that withdrawals from the underground will ultimately cause some reduction in ground \Yater levels. The
underground reserYoirs, to be efficiently used, must be
lowered and refilled. In \Yet periods this particular
ground \Yater reserYoir may refill completely, restoring
artesian pressure and causing \Yaste and seepage in the
lo\YPr outlets of the basin. In periods of drought there
may be con~l'tntive years \Yhen the ground ,,~ater levels
are lo\Yl\red, but proper use requires a reduction of level

14
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to the point where inflows (recharge) and withdrawals
reach a balance during a reasonable water cycle ( R. 146,
74). It is, of course, essential during the water cycle when
the ground water level is being lowered, that the withdrawals be controlled to such an extent that the levels are
never permitted to be drawn below the economic level
from which water can be pumped and economically used.
By this I mean that Nature on a fifty-year or longer
cycle may refill a reservoir which has through heavy use
been lowered 500 feet or more from ground surface.
Water may still be available, and in a physical sense the
water supply has not yet been exhausted. Yet to require
all to withdraw from such levels would be uneconomic.
In the economic sense the basin has been fully appropriated when on a reasonably short cycle the basin will
draw down only to a reasonable economic level and then
refill. Even within such a cycle drought may occur and as
ground water levels drop during periods of drought, the
late priorities must be shut off to the extent necessary
to prevent water levels from dropping below the ''safe
yield of the reservoir," or the economic level from which
water can be lifted. Through studies of ground water
trends and in effect through the taking of an inventory
of ground water supplies, the State Engineer can determine the level beyond which new applications must not
be approved. Within the water cycle, periods of drought
may require restriction of use on applications already
approved. Through such controls on approval of applications and regulation of applications after approval, our
underground supplies may be fully appropriated and used

15
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without permitting late priority rights to draw down
below the level which water can be economically pumped.
Some of the western states have not adopted underground water laws. Arizona has tried many times, without success. The troubles encountered in Colorado are
outlined in an article in 23 Rocky Mountain Law Review,
page 439, entitled, "Decade of Attempt to Get Ground
Water Law."
Utah has pioneered in the legislative field on underground water. When the Supreme Court indicated in
Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P. 2d 755 and the
companion case, Justesen v. Olson, 86 Utah 158, 40 P. 2d
802, that underground water was public water- not private, the Legislature adopted our comprehensive underground water law. The Supreme Court then confirmed in
Riordarn v. Westwood, 115 Utah 215, 203 P. 2d 922, that
for the underground water legislation to be constitutional,
the court must now hold that underground water has
always been public water, and that the earlier decisions
upholding correlative rights, and the still earlier cases on
absolute ownership were '"rong. Thus, appropriators
from 'veils are using the public "~a ter and their rights
of use are subject to the concepts of the appropriative
doctrine, 'vhich favors full development of all water
resources. Our immediatr problem is to determine
whether or not a prior appropriation from an underground basin gives to the appropriator a vested right to
have "'att'r pressures in the basin (or ground water
16
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levels) maintained as they were on the date of his
appropriation.
Text writers urge that individual well owners,
diverting from an underground reservoir, should be
held to have initiated their right with the understanding that the reservoir would be developed to
its "safe yield" and that each individual appropriator \vould be required to adjust his means of diversion to take at his own expense his share of the
public water from the common pool. In some respects
this charging of notice to the appropriator is analogous
to the situation involved in the case of Moyle v. Big Cottonwood Ta;n;ner Ditch Co., 109 Utah 213. There the Supreme Court said that the owner of a servient estate,
who has permitted an easement for an irrigation ditch
to come into existence by usage, did so with the knowledge that the irrigation ditch owner would be required
in the future by the law to make reasonable improvements
to conserve water and prevent waste. The basic concept
of the right to improve to prevent waste was recently
reaffirmed in Ha.rvey v. Haights Bench Irrigation Co.
(not yet reported), by the Supreme Court.
The original statutes enacted in 1935 empower the
State Engineer to control withdrawals of water from
underground basins, ( 1) by approval of or rejection of
applications; and (2) by administration of priorities.
Procedures were set up by which an inventory could be
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made of underground water supplies, and an extensive
program along this line has been initiated. <o
The Utah Supreme Court in Ha;nson v. Salt Lake
City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P. 2d 255, made the first major departure from the concept that an appropriator got a
vested right in pressure.
We think the Hanson case stands for the doctrine
that there is no vested right in an unreasonable means of
diversion from the underground. Hanson was trying
to make the City pay for equipment installed on his
well. It was conclusively shown that the City had
interfered "rith and lowered pressure in the basin.
The decision denied to Hanson any relief, because
his means of diversion was unreasonable. The court
did not hold that had his means been reasonable
he could have recovered the costs of the pump, and at
least t"'\vo of the judges (Wolfe and Latimer) expressed
their opinion to the effect that there is no vested right
to have artesian pressure, and water level maintained
at the levels existing at the time of the appropriation.
Mr. Justice Wolfe noted that his comments on this were
<1 > For example, in the 1950-52 Biennial Report, the State Engineer noted at page 69 that a state-w-ide investigation of underground
water resources was being undertaken, stating.:
"luvestigations of ground \Yater resources of Utah * * *
have been in progress since the State ground water law was
enacted in 1935. These investigations consist of two closely
interrelated phases: ( 1) A state-\vide inventory of ground
water storage, based upon periodic measurements of water
levels and artesian pressures in a network of observation
wells; and periodic checking of the chemical quality, temperature, and discharge of representative wrells; and (2) detailed
project type investigations of ground \Vater conditions, in
individual basins, and their relationship to maximun1 possible
economic development of water in such areas."
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dicta, and he expressed a like opinion as to comments on
this by other members of the court. Mr. Justice Pratt
notes that the discussion is "premature." We submit,
therefore, that this question is open for decision in Utah.
There have been many cases in the Western States
dealing with this subject. One of the best recognized text
writers in this field is Wells A. Hutchins. His book, "Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West"
is often cited with approval by our Utah Supreme Court.
The book is not readily available, so we quote from it at
some length. He analyzes four cases which were decided
in Arizona, California, Colorado and Idaho. These four
cases involve this principle. However, none of those states
had underground water legislation, and in addition, California adheres to the California doctrine of riparian
rights.
After analyzing the four cases, Hutchins, at page
176, notes that Utah and three other states have provided administrative procedure for governing the
appropriation of ground waters from determinable
sources. He then states :
"In all these States (which have administrative procedures) the State Engineer has authority
to determine whether there is unappropriated
water in an area in which development is proposed, and granting the application to appropriate ground water is contingent upon the
existence of unappropriated water in the proposed
source; but in Oregon, determination of the safe
yield of ground-water basin is expressly made
contingent upon a reasonable or feasible pumping

19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lift in case of pumping developments, or a reasonable or feasible reduction of pressure in case of
artesian developments. However, regardless of the
quantity of unappropriated water in any subterranean source, ground water is not available for
use under any circumstances unless it can be
brought to the surface in a feasible m(JffliJiber; a
yield assuredly is not 'safe' if not susceptible of
practicable use. Therefore, it would appear that
the feasibility of diversion of the entire safe yield
is a factor which must certainly govern the administrative :findings of safe yield under any of
these statutes. (Emphasis supplied.)
''Economic feasibility is as important as engineering feasibility. The ground-water supply in a
given case might be adequate for irrigation of all
overlying land if lifted 400 feet; but the value of
crops which it is possible to produce on that land
may be far too low to justify the cost of pumping
with such a lift. Economic feasibility in that area
may depend upon the use of only the water available at less depths.''
Hutchins then continues through pages 177-179 \Yith
an examination of various comments by hydrologists and
other authorities. He quotes ''Tith approval from a report
by Thompson and Fielder in a recent article on ''Legal
Control of Ground ''rater,'' \Yith specific reference to the
Idaho decisions and their implications. Thompson and
Fielder state :
''There is no indication in the decisions that
1he~ defe11dauts set up as their justification, that
by the lan's of uafure it luould generally be hnpossiblc for any subsequen-t users of ground wa,ter to
p1Mnp f1'"0-nJ, the san1e 1rater-bearing formation
1oithout aff e('f£ug to so Jne de,qree the ·1vater lecel
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and yield of every ~vell previously installed in the
area. Carried to an ultimate conclusion, these decisions might mean that in many areas the first
appropriator cou.ld require damages from every
subsequent appropriator and each subsequent
appropriator, in turn of priority, could require
damages from all later appropriators, wntil the
last on.e would have to pay tribute to all. If the doctrine of appropriation is to accomplish the desired
end of making full use of the ground-water resources of the state, it must be recognized that
some low-ering of the water table or of the artesian
pressure is a reasonable result of a reasonable
method of diversion (pumping) of the water, 01nd
should not constitute a basis for damages." (Emphasis supplied.)
Mr. Hutchins also notes a more recent article by Donald M. Baker, involving an Analysis of the Legal Conception of Sub-flow and Percolating Water, where it is
stated:
''If future decisions should hold that rights
to divert and use water from ground-water bodies include the right to maintenance of the elevation of the water in the wells, through which such
water is diverted, it would be a severe blow· to the
interest of conservation and highest utilization of
'such supplies. There is a great need for clarification of this phase of ground-water law." (Emphasis supplied.)
Hutchins then concludes:
''The present author is in full accord with
these statements. On the whole, it seems obvious
that to accord the first appropriator under a
ground-water administrative statute the right to
have the water level maintained at the point at
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which he first pumps it, or damages in lieu thereof,
so long as there is an adequate water supply of
equivalent quality available at lower depths from
which it is feasible to pump, would unduly complicate the administration of water rights in the area
and might seriously curtail the fullest utilization
of the ground-water supply, for later uses under
such a handicap may prove to be economically impracticable. This result would be out of line with
the purpose of the statute. Accordingly, these factors a.nd implications are worthy of consideration
in determining the question of reasonableness of
the first appropriator's diversion under such
circumstances." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Utah Supreme Court, in Ha;nson v. Salt Lake
City, supra, has squarely held that the prior appropriator
from a basin does not have a vested right in an unreasonable 1neans of diversion. Hutchins' comment in the quotation set forth above points the way and gives some of
the factors to be considered in determining whether plaintiff's flow wells here present a reasonable means. Development to this point has hardly drawn the water below
ground surface. Is it reasonable to grant them a vested
right to have the reservoir kept full, so that it mil spill
by artesian flow~ Or is it more reasonable to require them
to pump where the 'vater is almost at ground level~
With all the ''yithdra,vals to date, the ground 'Yater
level at the plaintiff's 'veils has al,vays been at or above
nine feet from tlH) surface ..All of the experts agree that
the basin is not eYen nearing full appropriation. New
applications be~~ond those of thP parties litigant can and
should hP n pproved.
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We sincerely urge the court to bear in mind the economics of the problem. An acre of land needs approximately three acre-feet of water per year. There is no
economic problem in this area in the lifting of water
from depths of 80 feet, as Mr. Andrews is now doing by
his pump well, but assuredly a new appropriator can not
lift his own three acre-feet and in addition pay for the
lifting of hundreds, or even thousands, of acre-feet for
others. Judge Latimer partially noted the problem in the
Hanson case, by referring to 6,000 wells in Salt Lake
County. It is presented more fully in the 28th Biennial
Report of the State Engineer for 1950 and 1952, where the
extent of our underground water development in various
major pump districts is analyzed. For example, in the
Milford District of Escalante Valley, the alluvial fan has
an areal extent of about 90 square miles. One hundred
twenty-five irrigation wells were pumped in that district
in 1951. <2 >
<2> They were distributed over 26 U. S. Land Survey sections, but
89 of the wells were concentrated in ten-square-mile area near Milford.
The decline in water level from pumping and development was about
eleven feet. However, in the area where the 89 wells were concentrated,
the drawndown during the pumping season was considerably greater
during the actual pumping.
In 1950, 30,000 acre-feet were pumped; in 1951, 32,200 acre-feet
were pumped. Then in a later report, Technical Publication No. 9 of
the State Engineer, it was noted that 41,300 acre-feet were pumped
in 1953. In the concentrated area, the water level at the beginning of
the pumping season mig.ht be forty feet higher than in the same area
at the end of the season. Still the hydrologists studying the basin concluded that while ground water pumping within the concentrated area
"is rapidly approaching its maximum," new withdrawals from the
basin "will not seriously change the existing conditions in the valley.
With continued pumping at the 1953 rate, however, water levels can
be expected to decline until a hydrological balance is reached between
the recharge to the ground water basin and natural and artificial
discharge."
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I mention the Milford Pumping District, because
there we have a withdrawal of more than 40,000 acre-feet
per year, a drawdown during the pumping season of
about 40 feet, and priorities scattered between more than
125 wells. A rule of law requiring each well owner to pay
a portion of the cost of bigger pumps and the power bill
for each user would have stopped development of this
district long ago. The last well driller could not pay even
one per cent of the cost of pumping 40,000 acre-feet, in
order to get the three acre-feet per acre for his own land.
This is only part of the problem. Administratively, the
problem is impossible. First, there is always the problem
of whether a particular foot or two of drop is caused by
natural causes or by withdrawals. Second, if it is caused
by withdrawals, the administrative problem of apportioning the pump lift between the various well owners with
varying priorities is impossible of calculation. Further,
if the new well which is drilled there this year is required
to pay its portion of the pumping cost for the more than
40,000 acre-feet presently being taken from the basin, as
a matter of economics, he can not drill, and ground water
development in the basin must stop. Yet the hydrologists studying the basin believe that with moderate drawdown the basin will year in and year out establish a balance with recharge, and that further development can
take place without overappropriating the basin or reducing the level below the ''safe yield.'' The water being
pumped from the Milford District is substantially equal
to Salt Lake City's interest in the Deer Creek project, and
for this interest the City paid $20,000,000.00. The 40,000
acre-feet would supply municipal water for a city of
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300,000 people, and Milford 1s only one of our many
underground basins.
A rule of law which would cause the cessation of development of our last major source of available water
must not be permitted to develop. Utah has an administrative law which gives to the State Engineer adequate
power to inventory our water supplies, to stop new
appropriations which will deplete any reservoir below its
safe yield, and which will permit year-to-year administration of wells on a priority basis. Each diverter of water
within the basin can afford to pump his share of the water
from a basin which is so controlled. New development can
proceed until the water in the underground basin is
appropriated to the point of safe yield. If in dry years the
cumulative withdrawals threaten to lower the level of
water in the basin to a point where the lift is not economic,
the State Engineer and courts can totally shut off the
later wells. Those with early priorities can thus be assured that they will never have an unreasonable lift, and
the State can have its enormous resources developed and
put to beneficial use. Is a means of diversion which will
prevent this development reasonable within the meaning
of the Hanson case~ A rule of law which will require the
next well drilled in Milford to pay part of the cost of
pumping 40,000 acre-feet of water and the cost of lowering pumps to the new water level will absolutely and
assuredly stop further ground water development in this
state, and it is not necessary to do this in order to protect
plaintiffs and leave them with all the water to which they
are entitled divertable at reasonable cost.
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We thus say that the rule of law suggested by the
above quotations from Hutchins and the rule of ''reasonable diversion'' of the Hanson case is the direction which
the law must take.
There is much discussion of this problem in the current periodicals. It is elaborately discussed in an article
in the current Utah Law Review, Vol. 5, Fall of 1956,
page 181. <3 >
Nevada and Oregon have both endeavored to handle
the matter by statute. The Oregon law is referred to by
Hutchins, where he says that,
<3 > The writer of that law review article cites most of the court
cases dealing with this subject, including the four cases from California, Idaho, Arizona and Colorado, noted by Hutchins. The writer fails
to note that none of these states has an underground water law. California follows the riparian rights doctrine. Colorado is still adhering
to the doctrine which Utah abandoned nearly 35 years ago of absolute
ownership of underground water by the owner of the soil. The doctrine
is modified to some extent by a strong presumption that underground
water is tributary to a stream, which presumption if not rebutted
brings the matter under the surface rights laws of Colorado. If this
presumption can be overcome, Colorado has no underground water
law. Thus Colorado is attempting to administer underground water
rights under its inadequate surface water status.
In any event, after noting. these cases, the writer of the Utah Law
Review comes out with the same conclusion as that reached by Hutchins. He notes that the trend in these cases is toward substantial protection to those making the first diversion by insulating them from
material costs to overcome the effects of further major developments.
He then states:
"This tendency to solidify the content of a given water
right too early in the development of a ground-water basin is
undesirable from a scientific standpoint and will tend to retard further development of the resource. Such a result is not
demanded by fairness to the first appropriators since they
made their diversions with the expectation that their supply
may become more difficult to maintain if not diminished or
destroyed because of changing conditions. If the original appropriation was made pursuant to an application to the State
Engineer, it \vas made with notice that it is one of many,
prior or subsequent, and the appropriator should not thereafter complain of a lowering water table so long as it is still
within a feasible pumping lift." (Emphasis supplied.)
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''In Oregon, determination of the safe yield of
a ground water basin is expressly made contingent
upon a reasonable or feasible pumping lift in case
of pumping developments, or a reasonable or feasible reduction of pressure in case of artesian
developments.''
Nevada Compiled Laws, Section 7899, Supplementall949, restricts the development of each basin to a point
which will not draw the water table down below the point
of safe yield. The statute gives notice to all applicants
for water in a basin. that in their appropriation they have
no vested right to ha,ve water in the basiln maintained at
any given level, so long as the level is not reduced below
the point of safe yield.
The subject matter is treated in a recent article in
4 Wyoming Law Journal 193, where again the writer,
after analyzing the problems reaches the same conclusion.
The subject matter is also treated in 28 Rocky Mountain Law Review.
Montana has also in the case of Crowley v. District
Court, 108 Montana 89, 88 P. 2d 23, approved the concept
that the means of diversion from the underground must
be reasonable.
The Utah Law Review article, the article by Hutchins, our Hanson case, and the law review articles and
cases which I have cited above, collectively outline practically all of the authorities that have developed to date
on this problem. We are in effect at the crossroads and
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must step out with the principle of law which will protect the existing users against an uneconomic lift, but
which will permit development of our basins to go
fol\Vard.

POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS ORDER REQUIRING REPLACEMENT OF THE WATER, IN THAT THERE IS
NOT SUFFICIENT PROOF OF THE QUANTITY OF WATER APPROPRIATED BY THE
VARIOUS PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 3770 TO SUPPORT AN ORDER FOR REPLACEMENT, IN ANY EVENT.
Insofar as proving the quantity of water appropriated, the plaintiffs Fowkes and the Andrews group
(all of whom own the old flow wells) merely introduced
their underground water claims, and no other evidence.
(R. Vol. 2, p. 9 and 10, Plaintiffs' Exh.1, Defendant's Exh.
A -25.) We do not here contend, nor did we in the lower
court, that there had not been a valid appropriation from
each of these old wells. In fact, we stipulated that an
appropriation had been made (R. 118). We, however,
expressly contended then and contend now that the underground water claims filed many years ago are not prima
facie evidence of the water right, and are not adequate
to prove the extent of the appropriation (R. Vol. II, p. 9,
11; R. 251).
The underground water la".. was enacted in 1935. It
provided for registration of underground rights acquired
prior to the enactment of the la,v. This section, as it was
originally enacted, is set forth as Sertion 100-5-12, U.C.A.
1943. The original act provided :
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''Within one year after the date of the approval of this act all claimants to rights to the use
of underground water shall file notice of such
claim or claims with the State Enginter on forms
furnished by him. * * * *
"Failure to file notice of claim or claims, as
provided in this section, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to abandon such claimed right or
rights, * * *.''
It was under the provisions of this section that the
various underground water claims which were introduced
in evidence here were filed.
It should be specifically noted that the section of the
1935 law under which these claims were filed specifically
made the failure to file a claim prima facie evidence of
abandonment, but it did not make the filing of the claim
prima facie evidence of the extent of the appropriation.
At the time this section was enacted, the section on
proof of appropriation was also in the law. The present
proof section was enacted in 1919, and while it has been
amended from time to time, it has always been essentially
as set forth in the 1943 Code under Section 100-3-16. By
Section 100-3-17, U.C.A. 1943 (now 73-3-17, U.C.A. 1953),
a certificate of appropriation issued under Section 16,
was made:
''prima facie evidence of the owner's right to
the use of the water in the quantity, for the purpose, at the place and during the times specified
therein, subject to prior rights.''
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There must have been a legislative reason for making
certificates of appropriation prima facie evidence of the
extent of the right and not giving like weight to underground water claims. The reason becomes apparent when
one examines the requirements then prevailing for filing
claims as against the requirements for :filing proof.
Section 16, on proof of appropriation, specified the
information which must be furnished in order to warrant
issuance of the certificate. Among other things, ''the
quantity of water in acre-feet or the flow in second-feet
appropriated * * * with detailed measurements of water
put to beneficial use, giving the date the measurements
were made and the name of the person making the measuremenris." The section also required the statement filed
to be "sworn to by the applicant and by two disinterested witnesses.'' It also expressly required that the
proof be accompanied by a map, profiles, and drawings
made on tracing linens ''by a reputable civil engineer.''
These rna ps, profiles and drawings had to correctly reflect
the work and had to be ''verified by oath of engineer who
made the same.''
Of still more importance was the fact that the State
Engineer had to function and make a determination that
the proof submitted \vas adequate. If he were satisfied
that the proof "~as correct, he issued a certificate. If not
he rejected and required more proof. Finally, the action
of the State Engineer in issuing the certificate of appropriation would be an appealable order under \vhat is now
Section 73-3-14, U. C.A., 1953.
30
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Contrast this with the provision of Section 100-5-12,
U.C.A. 1943, under which these subject claims were filed.
None of these safeguards were there provided. The State
Engineer did not function at all to accept or reject the
claim. No order was entered. He prescribed a form which
could be used, but when the claim was filed, the State Engineer neither approved or disapproved or in any other
way acted thereon. There was no provision for attestation by any disinterested person. There were· no maps,
plats, etc. There was no requirement of an engineer's
certificate. There was no requirement that the water be
actually measured. The 1935 statute obviously contemplated merely a registration of what the owner claimed,
and nothing more. Therefore, failure to file was by express statute made prima facie evidence of abandonment,
but the claim was not given any presumptive weight as
to the validity of the right claimed.
At the trial, the plaintiffs Fowkes relied upon the
fact that this 1935 law had been amended in 1955. They
contended that the amendment now made these claims
(all of which were filed before the amendment) prima
facie evidence of the extent of the right. The amendment
cannot be so construed. The 1935 provisions were repealed in 1955, and in their place was enacted Chapter 60
of the Session Laws of 1955, Sec. 73-5-13. That 1955 enactment by its terms related only to claims filed after
the effective date of the amendment. It provided in part
that all claimants to the right to use water
''whose rights are not represented by certificates of appropriation issued by the State Engi31
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neer, by applications filed with the State Engineer,
by court decree or by notice of cla.ims heretofore filed pursuarnt to law, shall :file notice of
claims * * *." (Emphasis supplied)
The section goes on to provide that such claim is to be
:filed with the State Engineer on forms furnished by him,
setting forth, ''such information and accompanied by
such proof as the State Engineer may require."
The forms now prescribed under the 1955 law require
detail substantially the same as that required to support
issuance of a certificate of appropriation. It is suggested
that proof maps prepared by a registered engineer should
accompany the claims, that the maps when made ''are to
conform to the rules and regulations for submitting
proof of appropriation.'' The form goes on to note expressly that since the claims are prima facie evidence, the
claimant should support his claim ''in the most substantial manner by securing the affidavit of witnesses,'' etc.
In regard to measurements, the rule printed on the form
states:
''In submitting water measurements, it must
clearly be shown that the measurement is of the
water actually diverted and used. Sufficient detailed data relatiYe to the measurement are to be
submitted so that one may compute therefrom the
quantity of water measured. Standard measurements are to be used. ' '
The form requires other Yery detailed information.
The signature of the claimant must be under oath. There
is provision for the affidavit of two disinterested ·zcitnesses
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(as is required in submitting proof) and there is also a
provision for am engineer's certificate. Thus, a claim filed
under the 1955 law on the forms now furnished by the
State Engineer and containing ''such proof as the State
Engineer" requires, is nearly as complete as a proof of
appropriation, and claims thus filed were made prima
facie evidence by the 1955 Legislature.
The section does not even by its terms purport to
make claims filed under the prior law (without any of the
detailed supporting data) prima facie evidence of anything. The 1955 statute expressly limits its effect to
claims which have not ''heretofore'' been filed. The 1955
act states:
''All claimants to the right to the use of water,
whose rights are not represented by * * * notice of
claim heretofore filed pursuant to law shall file
notice of such claim. * * * Such notice of claim, as
provided in this section shall be prima facie evidence of the claimed right therein described.''
This cannot be construed to say that claims filed
under the 1935 act are by this statute made prima facie
evidence of anything.
In making this argument we are well aware of the
fact that the Legislature, as a princi pie of constitutional
law, may provide rules of evidence and under some situations may make the rules of evidence retroactive. But
the Legislature did not endeavor to do so here. It would
have been extremely unwise for the Legislature to have
attempted to provide that these old self -serving claims
filed without actual measurements and without any sup33
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porting data, except the naked claim, are prima facie
evidence of the right. The claims themselves are incomplete (plaintiffs' Exh. 1). The flows are obviously estimates, and the works described are indefinite and vague.
To make us replace the full quantity of water claimed
without requiring plaintiffs to adduce any proof as to the
extent of their appropriation was error. For only claims
filed under the 1955 law and containing the required
proof, affidavits, etc., were made prima facie evidence by
the stautes.
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING THE IRRIGATION COMPANY AND ANDREWS TO EACH REPLACE HALF THE
WATER, IN THAT THERE IS NO BASIS IN
THE RECORD FOR SUCH AN APPORTIONMENT OF REPLACEMENT COSTS, AND
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE ONLY CAUSE FOR DIMINUTION IN
PLAINTIFS' WELLS WAS INTERFERENCE
BY ANDREWS AND THIS APPELLANT.
We are combining under Point III the last three
points covered by our designation of points on appeal.
We think they are inter-related and can best be discussed
together.
(a) The Trial Court has Ignored the TVhole Priority
System.

Certainly, the primary rights as established by the
evidence are the rights to the use of the 'vater from the
springs. All the parties hereto haYe rights in the springs
(Findings 4, 5, and 6, p. 16"7). They were found by the
34
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

trial court to be owned in part by Andrews, in part by
Fowkes, and the winter flow by the Irrigation Company.
The next rights in point of priority are the shallow wells,
owned by Plaintiffs Fowkes and Andrews. The next priority is the railroad well (R. 227). This is leased by the
principal stockholder of the Irrigation Company (R. 227,
293). The duty to replace water for the shallow wells and
springs of the plaintiffs Fowkes is honored. The right of
Andrews to receive water from his shallow wells is ignored, and the right to have the water replaced for the
railroad well and the Irrigation Company and Andrews
springs is ignored. Then as between the Andrews pump
well and the Irrigation Company flow wells, the priorities
are ignored, and an order is entered that each must
replace half the water. The court found that Andrews
pumps 6 c.f.s. and the Irrigation Company gets only 2.74
c.f.s. (Findings 5 and 6, R. 167). The fact that all of this
well development will interfere with the natural sources
of inflow to our reservoir is ignored. This we note in more
detail under sub-paragraph (c) hereof. The large underground development in the Nephi area is ignored, and no
provision is made for administration of the area as the
owners of other applications (not parties to this suit)
who have filed for permission to drill on the fan proceed
to drill (R. 29). Andrews has declared it to be his intention to drill another well and to withdraw an additional
6 c.f.s. (Finding No. 5). No provision is made for administration of the basin when he does this. The Irrigation
Company is granted the right to pump its wells (Finding
6). The court has just taken a "flock shot" at the problem, ignoring the whole doctrine of priority. It has adopt35
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ed an administrative order which can be administered
only if the basin remains unchanged. Still as entered it
will be res judicata. Regardless of further developments,
Andrews must replace half of the Fowkes water, and we
must replace half. We submit that the order simply has
no basis in the record.

(b) There Are Others Withdrawing Water from the
Basin and Their Priorities Are Later Tha;n the
Priorities of Any of the Parties Hereto.
We have set forth in substantial detail in our Statement of Fact the evidence on which we rely in support
of this proposition. There are recent developments in the
vicinity of Nephi which collectively take from the underground approximately 21 c.f.s. of water (Vol. 2, page 33).
These Nephi filings are later than the filings of the Irrigation Company and Andrews. The only issue, therefore,
is whether these wells have an effect on ground water
levels in the basin. If the court is to hold that the plaintiffs Fowkes and the defendants Andrews' shallow wells
and the springs of Fowkes, Andrews and the Irrigation
Company have a vested right to have the ground water
level mainatined as it \vas when the springs were appropriated and the shallow wells drilled, and is to further
hold that these are to be administered on a priority basis,
then it must follow, as night follows day, that anyone
with a later priority, \Yho lo\v-ers the ground water level,
should be ordered to participate in the replacement. We
think the evidence conclusively shows that these developments in the vicinity of Nephi do have a diree.t effect on
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ground water levels, and that it was error for the court to
ignore the Nephi development in entering its order. Admittedly, insofar as the plaintiffs Fowkes are concerned,
it greatly simplifies their problem if they can treat the
fan adjacent to Mona as a separate and independent basin
isolated from all other areas. But the record will not sustain this concept.
As we have indicated in our Statement of Facts, three
parties qualified as experts. Mr. Mayo was called as an
expert witness at various stages of the hearing, by both
the Irrigation Company and the shallow well owners. He
had conducted the tests in the basin and was accepted as
a qualified expert by each of us as we called him. His
testimony that the Nephi and Mona areas are a single
hydrologic basin was corroborated by Dr. Hansen and
was not denied by anyone.
Mr. Mayo was asked (Vol. 2 page 33) whether he
thought the well drilling in Nephi has had or will have
an affect on this particular basin. He answered:
''The topography and hydrology of the area I
think would indicate and there is some evidence on
the basis of previous studies made by other people
that the area from Nephi City north to the outlet
for the Mona Reservoir might possibly be a single
hydrologic unit.''
He indicated there might be subdivisions within the
basin or unit, but he had made no observations or experiments which would demonstrate whether such is the case
(Vol. 2, page 34).
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Dr. Hansen was extensively examined concerning
this problem and his testimony covered many pages. He
was asked to give his opinion as to the outer limits of the
ground water basin from which the Mona wells get their
water. He answered that geologically "we would be
obliged to say that the outer limits of the basin would be
the outer limits of the drainage into the basin" (R. 143).
We have water coming into the basin from short canyons
leading in from both sides. The overall drainage is from
the south toward the north. The outlet is to the north and
where the Mona Reservoir is now located in a sense represents the lower part of this basin. He stated: "I am not
aware of any other outlet from the basin,'' except through
the area where the Mona Reservoir now is (R. 143). He
vvas then asked whether the large well development taking
place around Nephi City is inter-related to the Mona
wells, and he answered that when the underground in that
area is charged to overflowing, he would anticipate a seepage or percolation to the north. If there were no development in the Nephi area and the underground basin there
filled up with water, the percolation would go toward the
north, and "the Mona basin would profit by it" (R. 144).
He said there was no place else the ''ater could go. The
static ground water level is higher in elevation in the
Nephi area than it is in the l\Iona area, and the natural
drainage is toward Mona (R. 144). Because of this, Dr.
Hansen said that the taking of 21 e.f.s. of \Vater from the
Mona area would have some influence on the amount of
water that would spill north\\~ard, and it \\. . ould be such
that it probably could actually be measured by shutting
the wells off and on, particularly if there are intermediate
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wells between Mona and Nephi ( R. 145). The complete
drainage into the basin would have to be considered as
part of the recharge area. The N ebo mountains to the
east are part of an overthrust with fault planes inclined
toward the west. There would be considerable recharge
from the mountain area to the east (R.145). He noted the
Burraston Spring area, which he thinks is related to an
east-west fault between Mona and Nephi, and that it
"might well be supplied from subsurface percolation or
movement from the south. I wouldn't know of any other
way to reason" (R. 146). On cross-examination (R. 166)
Dr. Hansen noted that he had seen a map showing the
static water levels, and it showed that the area drained
north. Later (R. 195, Exh. D-17) the map was introduced
in evidence. He said that the surface drainage is also
from Nephi toward the north. He expressed the opinion
that there is no defined underground channel connecting
the fan at Nephi with the fan in question, but said he was
sure the fans coalesce (R. 150). In describing the fan, he
indicated that the upper part would be a fan made by the
mountain streams and the lower part would be a delta
because of Lake Bonneville (R. 177). He noted that the
Irrigation Company wells are on the very outskirts or
even beyond the toe of the fan itself, so that:
''I would think the wells are more highly influenced by the deposit within the basin than by
the fan itself. * * * I should think that the chief
source of water in that fan area without a doubt
had been the drainage out of those canyons, but I
wouldn't want to preclude the possibility of
ground water percolation down an actual slope of
the basin into the lower level. No, I should imagine
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that we would have- how much, I wouldn't want
to estimate how much, but I think yon couldn't
only- you couldn't read it out. I should think it
might represent an appreciable amount of the
water that gets into that basin." (R. 178)

(c) The Evidence Conclusively Sho~os That the
Mona Reservoir W auld Receive the Total Overflow From the Basin, and the Trial Court
Ignored This.
The plaintiffs Fowkes are asserting that they have a
vested right to have natural conditions remain as they
were on the day they made their appropriation. They
seek to create the impression that they were the first in
the area, and by their appropriations acquired a vested
right to the natural artesian pressures of the basin. Because of this, they complain that it is in effect immoral
to make them now pump. If this court so holds and overrules us on Point No. I, we believe consideration must be
given to the fact that the Mona. Reservoir as the surface
outlet for the basin has always received the primary
benefit from an under-developed basin. We, as much as,
they are being damaged by development in this basin by
others.
Here again there is no dispute in the evidence. Mr.
Mayo was questioned on this point. Beginning in Volume
2, page 57, the witness "~as asked " ..hether any study had
been made to determine 'vhether there are leaks from the
artesian basin into the Mona ReserYoir itself. He answered that he did not know of any detailed investigation,
but ''we use the general opinion of people familiar with
40
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the situation that the reservoir picks up, so to speak, all
of the overflow from the ground water basin.'' He stated
that in an artesian basin, where there is considerable
pressure, it is the "very usual thing" for the pressure to
break out in the form of springs at the lower end of the
basin. He stated that the lower end of this basin is covered by the Mona Reservoir, that it is the outlet for the
basin.
Mr. David I. Gardner was asked on cross-examination about the same subject, and he answered to the same
general effect. He was called as an expert by the plaintiffs
Fowkes. He was asked if it was not good practice to
empty and refill an underground basin, and he answered
generally that such would be the case. He was then asked:

' 'Q. If you keep an artesian basin filled so that
you have a hydrostatic head 15 feet above ground
level, you almost always have waste through the
form of swamps and springs and leaks at the lower
part of the basin, don't you?

''A. Yes.
'' Q. And in order to stop those wastes into the
swamps and the lower parts of the basin, why,
it's customary and good irrigation practice to reduce that artesian presesure and pump the water
and empty and refill the basin yearly, is it not~

''A. That would be the method to utilize all the
water within the basin." (R. 73)
Dr. Hansen, as has been detailed above in the statement of facts, supported these opinions. In addition to
this, there is testimony from the lay witnesses to the effect
that the marshes, springs and seeps actually existed and
fed the reservoir.
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On Cross-examination of Max Thomas, the attorney
for Plaintiffs Fowkes developed that there are springs
which recharge the Mona Reservoir (VoL 2, p. 87).
John Roundy, who owned what is now the Andrews
place, immediately above the reservoir testified (R. 256)
that the land below the spring was wet, and that "I had
to drain' ' part of it. He indicated that one of the springs
from which he used water was only about three-fourths of
a mile from the reservoir (R. 255), and that the natural
drainage was into the reservoir, that the natural springs
went into an old draw, and ''for 100 years'' went down
out the area which is now occupied by the Mona Reservoir, "for that is the only way it could go." Mr. Mayo
testified concerning actual conditions as he had observed
them, and said that (VoL 2, pages 61 and 62):
''The pressures from our records would indicate
that the degree of storage within the ground water
basin created rather large pressures within the
artesian acquifiers and the existence of the many
springs and S\Yamp area would indicate that there
is a substantial leakage from those underground
acquifiers to the surface of the ground, and there
is a good deal of rather swamp land, marsh land,
associated with the reservoir, and it appears that
there may yet be water that could be taken from
the basin \vithin the limits of the recharge. That
is over and above "~hat is presently being
discharged.''
It is thus respectfully submitted that the record
stands uncontradicted that 'vc have an artesian basin
which is oreupied at the point of its outlet by the Mona
42
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Reservoir. This reservoir is fed by numerous seeps and
springs. Actual tests show that the artesian reservoir,
when full, has high artesian pressures which would be
expected to and do cause these leaks. As the artesian
basin has been developed by the well owners, the ground
water tables have been lowered. Springs which have heretofore flowed have gone dry. The suit brought by plaintiffs Fowkes and the cross-claim by the defendant Andrews are both predicated upon the theory that the
ground water development has dried up the springs. The
trial court has found that this is so, and has ordered replacement of the spring water for the plaintiffs Fowkes.
The record also stands uncontradicted to the effect that
the Mona Reservoir area always has caught the total
overflow from the artesian basin.

CONCLUSION
In the end result there is no one who will benefit more
from a full basin than will we. The total overflow from
the basin is and always has been yielded to the area now
occupied by our reservoir. The higher we maintain artesian pressures, the greater will be the seeps, leaks and
springs into the reservoir. It is fundamentally contrary
to either morals or sound legal principles to hold that
others may go into the basin, destroy the artesian pressures, empty the underground acquifers and lower the
ground water table, thus shutting off the historic flows to
the reservoir, and then hold that when the owners of the
reservoir come to the basin to participate in its develop43
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ment, they can only do so if they replace by pumping the
waters of those who drilled first. We submit, therefore,
that the case must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE
Attorney for Current Creek
Irrigatiqn Company
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